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Abstract
We present a logic for reasoning with if-then formulas which involve
constants for rational truth degrees from the unit interval. We introduce
graded semantic and syntactic entailment of formulas. We prove the logic
is complete in Pavelka style and depending on the choice of structure of
truth degrees, the logic is a decidable fragment of the Rational Pavelka
logic (RPL) or the Rational Product Logic (RΠL). We also present a
characterization of the entailment based on least models and study related
closure structures.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we are interested in a logic for reasoning with if-then rules describ-
ing dependencies between graded attributes. A graded attribute may be seen
as a propositional variable which may be assigned a truth degree coming from a
scale of degrees which includes intermediate degrees of truth. In this paper, we
use particular complete residuated lattices on the real unit interval as the scales
of truth degrees. As a consequence, if p is a propositional variable and e(p)
denotes its truth value under the evaluation e, we admit e(p) ∈ [0, 1] with the
possibility of 0 < e(p) < 1. The meaning of the degrees assigned to propositional
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variables conforms to the meaning in mathematical fuzzy logics [14, 15, 29, 32],
i.e., the meaning is comparative: e(p) < e(q) means that propositional variable
p is (strictly) less true than q under the evaluation e. Let us stress at this point
that the degrees we use are not and shall not be interpreted as degrees of belief
or evidence, cf. “the frequentist’s temptation” in [32] and also [34].
Admitting the intermediate degrees of truth may be valuable in situations
where attributes represented by propositional variables may not be assigned
either of the classic truth degrees 0 (falsity) and 1 (truth). This may occur in
situations where human perception and judgment is involved. For instance, if
we ask a person whether $400,000 is a high price for a house in a particular
neighborhood, the person may hesitate to describe the price as being (strictly)
high or (strictly) not high. Indeed, the person may feel that a sentence “The
price of the house sold at $400,000 is high” is true in a general way, but is not
completely true. This fact may be captured by assuming that the attribute
“price is high” represented by a propositional variable p is assigned a truth
degree e(p) which is close to 1 but strictly less than 1 and we may further
be interested in reasoning with this fact. Formal treatment of reasoning with
such facts is the main subject of mathematical fuzzy logics and is also the main
subject of this paper.
In this paper we focus on reasoning with formulas formalizing if-then depen-
dencies between graded attributes. Namely, given an evaluation of propositional
variables p1, p2, . . . , q1, q2, . . ., we formalize (the semantics of) rules of the form
if (p1 is true at least to degree a1 and · · · and
pn is true at least to degree an),
then (q1 is true at least to degree b1 and · · · and
qn is true at least to degree bn).
Moreover, we present a logical system for reasoning with such rules and prove its
soundness, completeness, and present its relationship to existing logics. We call
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our logic rational because we allow only rational degrees from the unit interval
to appear in the if-then rules. This is a similar assumption as in the Rational
Pavelka logic (RPL) proposed by Ha´jek [31, 32] which extends  Lukasiewicz logic
by constants for rational truth degrees and corresponding bookkeeping axioms.
In fact, when the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra is used as the structure of truth
degrees, our logic can be seen as a particular fragment of RPL. Analogously,
when the standard Goguen (product) algebra is used as the structure of truth
degrees, our logic becomes a fragment of the Rational Product Logic (RΠL)
which has been proposed by Esteva, Godo, Ha´jek, and Navara in [21].
Another common attribute of our logic and RPL (or RΠL) is that we consider
degrees of entailment on both the semantic and syntactic levels. That is, for
a formula ϕ and a theory Σ, we consider a degree ||ϕ||Σ ∈ [0, 1] to which ϕ is
semantically entailed by Σ and in general, we may have 0 < ||ϕ||Σ < 1. More
importantly, we also consider a degree |ϕ|Σ to which ϕ is provable by Σ and,
again, we may have 0 < |ϕ|Σ < 1. Logics with graded notions of provability
were first investigated by Pavelka [42, 43, 44] who was inspired by ideas in
the influential paper by Goguen [28]. In his seminal papers, Pavelka proposed
very general approach to abstract logics with graded notions of provability and
proved completeness of a propositional logic based on the standard  Lukasiewicz
algebra [36] as the structure of truth degrees. The completeness theorem states
that |ϕ|Σ = ||ϕ||Σ, i.e., the degrees of semantic entailment coincide with the
degrees of provability. This particular type of completeness of multiple-valued
logics has later become known as the Pavelka completeness, cf. [32, Section 9.2].
The contribution of Ha´jek’s RPL is in simplification of Pavelka’s ideas, including
(i) the use of (constants for) only rational truth degrees and thus keeping the
language of the logic countable and (ii) considering proofs in the ordinary sense
instead of considering them as sequences of weighted formulas as in the original
approach [42, 43, 44] by Pavelka. Further details and development of Pavelka-
complete logics can be found in [26, 41] and the references therein.
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The logic we present is complete in the Pavelka style and depending on the
choice of a structure of truth degrees (the standard  Lukasiewicz or Goguen al-
gebra), it may be seen as a decidable fragment of RPL or RΠL which uses only
formulas in a particular form. Our logic may be seen as logic which falls into the
category of fuzzy logics with rational constants for truth degrees [13, 19, 22, 48]
and develops our previous results on logic of fuzzy attribute implications which
were limited to finite structures of truth degrees [7, 11] or utilized infinitary
deduction rules in order to ensure completeness in Pavelka style [8, 37]. In con-
trast to these previous results, the present approach shows logics with finitary
deduction rules and particular structures of truth degrees defined on the real
unit interval. In a broader sense, our paper is interested in if-then rules which
generalize analogous rules that appear in database systems as functional depen-
dencies [40]), logic programming [38], or data analysis [1, 25, 53] as attribute
implications or association rules.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey preliminaries
from structures of truth degrees used in this paper (the section may be skipped
by readers familiar with residuated lattices). In Section 3, we describe our logic
and present its completeness. The proof of completeness together with further
notes are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present characterization of
closure structures related to systems of models of theories.
2 Preliminaries
In our paper, we consider particular linear complete integral commutative resid-
uated lattices [24, 52] as the structures of degrees. The structures are defined
as general algebras L = 〈L,∧,∨,⊗,→, 0, 1〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉, where
(i) 〈L,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is a linear complete lattice [12],
(ii) 〈L,⊗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid, and
(iii) for all a, b, c ∈ L, we have a⊗ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b→ c
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Property (iii) is called the adjointness of ⊗ (truth function of “fuzzy conjunc-
tion”) and → (truth function of “fuzzy implication”); note that ≤ denotes the
linear order induced by ∧, i.e., a ≤ b iff a ∧ b = a (equivalently, a ∨ b = b).
In our paper, we use linear complete residuated lattices defined on the real
unit interval which are given by left-continuous triangular norms [36] which
play central role in the Basic Logic (BL, see [32]) and Monoidal T-norm Logic
(MTL, see [20]). That is, 〈L,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 represents the real unit interval with its
natural ordering (∧ and ∨ coincides with operations of minima and maxima,
respectively), ⊗ is associative, commutative, neutral with respect to 1, and is
left-continuous (distributive with respect to general suprema), i.e., it satisfies
∨{a⊗ bi; i ∈ I} = a⊗∨{bi; i ∈ I} (1)
for all a ∈ [0, 1] and {bi ∈ [0, 1]; i ∈ I}. Moreover, the corresponding (uniquely
given) → which is adjoint to ⊗ is then given by
a→ b = ∨{c ∈ [0, 1]; a⊗ c ≤ b}. (2)
Two structures which are most relevant for our investigation are the so-called
standard  Lukasiewicz and Goguen (product) algebras denoted  L and Π, respec-
tively, where the multiplications and residua are given by
a⊗ L b = max{0, a+ b− 1}, (3)
a→ L b = min{1, 1− a+ b}, (4)
and
a⊗Π b = ab, (5)
a→Π b =

1, if a ≤ b,
b
a , otherwise.
(6)
If  L and Π are clear from the context, we omit the subscripts and write just
⊗ and →, respectively. Notice that both ⊗ L and ⊗Π are continuous functions.
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As a consequence,
∧{a⊗ bi; i ∈ I} = a⊗∧{bi; i ∈ I} (7)
for all a ∈ [0, 1] and {bi ∈ [0, 1]; i ∈ I}. Moreover, → L is continuous in both
its arguments, →Π is continuous in the second argument and left-continuous in
the first one. As a consequence, the residua in both  L and Π satisfy
∧{a→ bi; i ∈ I} = a→ ∧{bi; i ∈ I}, (8)∧{ai → b; i ∈ I} = ∨{ai; i ∈ I} → b, (9)∨{a→ bi; i ∈ I} = a→ ∨{bi; i ∈ I} (10)
and, in addition,  L satisfies
∨{ai → b; i ∈ I} = ∧{ai; i ∈ I} → b. (11)
More details on the structures of degrees can be found in [36].
In order to simplify our considerations about if-then rules between graded
attributes, we use L-fuzzy sets and related notions. Consider a non-empty set
U which acts as a universe of elements. Each map A : U → L, where L is the
set of truth degrees in L is called an L-fuzzy set [27] (shortly, an L-set) in U
and the degree A(u) is interpreted as “the degree to which u belongs to the
L-set A”. The collection of all L-sets in U is denoted by LU . Furthermore,
A ∈ LU is called finite whenever {u ∈ U ; A(u) > 0} is a finite set; A ∈ LU
is called a singleton, written {a/u}, whenever A(u) = a and A(v) = 0 for all
v ∈ U \ {u}; A ∈ LU is called rational whenever {A(u); u ∈ U} ⊆ [0, 1]Q where
[0, 1]Q denotes the rational unit interval.
We consider operations with L-sets which are defined componentwise using
the operations in L. Namely, for Ai ∈ LU (i ∈ I), A ∈ LU , and c ∈ L, we define⋂{Ai; i ∈ I} (the intersection of Ai’s), ⋃{Ai; i ∈ I} (the union of Ai’s), c⊗A
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(the c-multiple of A), and c→ A (the c-shift of A) by putting
(⋂{Ai; i ∈ I})(u) = ∧{Ai(u); i ∈ I}, (12)(⋃{Ai; i ∈ I})(u) = ∨{Ai(u); i ∈ I}, (13)
(c⊗A)(u) = c⊗A(u), (14)
(c→A)(u) = c→ A(u), (15)
for all u ∈ U . In addition, if |I| = 2, we use the usual infix notation A ∩B and
A ∪B to denote (12) and (13), respectively.
ForA,B ∈ LU , we consider two basic types of containment relations. Namely,
a bivalent containment relation and a graded containment relation. In the
first case, we write A ⊆ B and say that A is fully contained in B whenever
A(u) ≤ B(u) holds for each u ∈ U . In the second case, we define a degree
S(A,B) ∈ L to which A is a subset of B by
S(A,B) =
∧{A(u)→ B(u); u ∈ U}. (16)
Using the properties of L, it is easily seen that A ⊆ B iff A(u) → B(u) = 1
holds for all u ∈ U which is true iff S(A,B) = 1. See [5, Theorem 3.12] for
further details on properties of graded subsethood.
In the paper, we utilize particular fuzzy closure operators. Recall that an
operator c : LU → LU is called an L-closure operator [4, 47] on the set U
whenever the following conditions
A ⊆ c(A), (17)
S(A,B) ≤ S(c(A), c(B)), (18)
c(c(A)) = c(A), (19)
are satisfied for all A,B ∈ LU , cf. also [5, Section 7.1]. A non-empty system
S ⊆ LU (of L-sets in U) is called directed whenever for any A,B ∈ S there is
C ∈ S such that A ⊆ C and B ⊆ C.
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3 Rational fuzzy attribute logic
In this section, we introduce the rational fuzzy attribute logic (RFAL). We
describe its language, formulas, their semantic entailment and a graded notion
of provability. We present the Pavelka completeness of our logic which is proved
in the next section.
The language of our logic is given by
• a (denumerable) set Var of propositional variables, and
• the set of constants for rational truth degrees, i.e., for each a ∈ [0, 1]Q we
consider a constant a.
Propositional variables in Var are denoted by p, q, . . . Note that the distinction
between rational truth degrees in [0, 1] and the constants for the degrees is
essentially the same as in RPL [31] and is motivated by proper distinction
between the syntax and semantics of our logic.
Using symbols for logical connectives c (conjunction) and i (implication),
we consider formulas of the following form
((a1 i p1) c · · · c (am i pm)) i ((b1 i q1) c · · · c (bn i qn)), (20)
where p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qn ∈ Var and a1, . . . , am, b1, . . . , bn are constants for
truth degrees. We call such formulas rational fuzzy attribute implications. Note
that according to the standard meaning of c andi which is used in fuzzy logics
in the narrow sense, (20) can be understood as a formula expressing the fact
that “if p1 is true at least to degree a1 and · · · and pn is true at least to degree
an, then q1 is true at least to degree b1 and · · · and qn is true at least to degree
bn” which corresponds with the intended meaning of the rules we have described
in Section 1. Also note that (20) is a well-formed formula in a language of MTL
(or a stronger logic) which is extended by constants for truth degrees.
In order to define the semantics of formulas like (20), we use the usual
notion of evaluation of propositional variables which uniquely extends to all
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formulas, including those in the form of (20). In a more detail, we call any map
e : Var → [0, 1] an evaluation (notice that e(p) may be irrational) and define
the degree ||ϕ||e to which a general well-formed formula in our language is true
under e:
||p||e = e(p), (21)
||ϕi ψ||e = ||ϕ||e → ||ψ||e, (22)
||ϕ c ψ||e = ||ϕ||e ∧ ||ψ||e, (23)
||a||e = a, (24)
for all p ∈ Var, formulas ϕ,ψ, and a ∈ [0, 1]Q (other connectives may be intro-
duces but we do not need them for our development, cf. [20, 32]). If ϕ is (20),
then ||ϕ||e ∈ [0, 1] is the degree to which ϕ is true under e. The notion of degrees
of semantic entailment of formulas is then defined as follows: An evaluation e
is called a model of a set Σ of formulas whenever ||ϕ||e = 1 for all ϕ ∈ Σ. The
degree ||ϕ||Σ to which ϕ is entailed by Σ is defined
||ϕ||Σ =
∧{||ϕ||e; e is a model of Σ}. (25)
In this paper, we are primarily interested in syntactic characterization of ||ϕ||Σ
for ϕ and all formulas in Σ being of the form (20).
Before we introduce our axiomatization, let us present a concise way of
representing formulas like (20) and their entailment. Since both the antecedent
and consequent of (20) are of the form of conjunctions of subformulas (and
c is interpreted by a truth function which is commutative, associative, and
idempotent), we may encode the antecedents and consequents by finite rational
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L-sets in Var. Indeed, for (20), we may consider A,B ∈ LVar given by
A(p) =

ai, if p equals pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
0, otherwise,
(26)
B(p) =

bi, if p equals qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
0, otherwise,
(27)
for all p ∈ Var. Under this notation, (20) may be written as
Ai B (28)
and the degree ||Ai B||e to which Ai B is true under e may be defined as
||Ai B||e = S(A, e)→ S(B, e), (29)
where S(A, e) and S(B, e) are subsethood degrees (16). A moment’s reflection
shows that if ϕ denotes (20) and A i B is the corresponding abbreviation
of (20) with A and B given by (26) and (27), respectively, then
||ϕ||e = ||Ai B||e (30)
for any evaluation e : Var → [0, 1]. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we use
primarily the abbreviated form (28) of formulas (where both A,B are finite and
rational L-sets in Var) which simplifies some of our considerations.
Remark 1. The first approach to attribute implications between graded (fuzzy)
attributes was introduced by Pollandt [45]. She studied the formulas mainly
from the point of view of formal concept analysis [25] of data with fuzzy at-
tributes and she did not present any complete axiomatization of the proposed
semantic entailment. Conceptually, the formulas used by Pollandt [45] corre-
spond to (28) and its interpretation as in (29). Later, the approach was general-
ized by considering truth-stressing hedges [10, 23, 33] as additional parameters
of the interpretation of the formulas, see [7] for a survey and [11] for recent
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results. The utilization of hedges proved interesting because stronger (and de-
sirable) properties of fuzzy attributes implications (like uniqueness of minimal
bases obtained via pseudo-intents [11, 30]) result by specific choices of hedges
(e.g., by the choice of globalization [49] which on linear structures of degrees
coincides with Baaz’s ∆, cf. [3]). Even more general concept of a parameteri-
zation of fuzzy attribute implications is introduced in [51] based on algebras of
isotone Galois connections.
From now on, we use the following assumption.
Assumption 1. L = 〈L,∧,∨,⊗,→, 0, 1〉 is a complete residuated lattice on
the real unit interval and ⊗ and → are defined so that for any a, b ∈ [0, 1]Q, we
have a⊗ b ∈ [0, 1]Q and a→ b ∈ [0, 1]Q. In this case, we say that L is rationally
closed.
The assumption says basically that ⊗ and → applied to rational arguments
yield rational results. This is obviously satisfied for both  L and Π. As a
consequence, if A ∈ LU and c are rational, then c⊗A and c→A given by (14)
and (15), respectively, are also rational.
Our logic uses a deductive system which consists of a single axiom scheme
and two deduction rules:
(i) each formula of the form A∪B i B where A,B are finite rational L-sets
in Var is an axiom;
(ii) the deduction rules of cut and multiplication:
(Cut) from Ai B and B∪C i D infer A∪C i D,
(Mul) from Ai B infer c⊗Ai c⊗B,
for all finite rational L-sets A,B,C,D in Var and c ∈ [0, 1]Q.
Observe that c⊗A and c⊗B are both rational and finite, i.e., (Mul) is a
well-defined deduction rule. Analogously, the axioms and (Cut) are well defined
because a union of finitely many rational finite L-sets is a finite rational L-set.
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Remark 2. (a) Our deduction system resembles the famous system by Arm-
strong [2] which in database systems plays a central role in reasoning about
functional dependencies and normalized database schemes [40]. Namely, if we
replace L-sets by ordinary sets, the axioms together with (Cut) form a system
which is equivalent to that of Armstrong. Note that in database systems (Cut)
is usually presented under the name pseudotransitivity [35, 40]. Deductive sys-
tems for fuzzy attribute implications based on (Mul) and (Cut) are also present
in [7, 11] and generalized in [8, 37] by considering infinitary deduction rules to
ensure completeness over arbitrary infinite L.
(b) Since the axioms and deduction rules we deal with use abbreviations
for formulas like (20), it is worth noting that our axioms and deduction rules
may also be understood as formulas and deduction rules in the ordinary (narrow)
sense. We may prove that in MTL (or a stronger logic) enriched by constants for
rational truth degrees and bookkeeping axioms, the axiom schemes are provable,
and (Mul) and (Cut) are derived deduction rules. In this remark, let C denote
a logic which results from MTL (or a stronger logic) by adding constants for
rational truth degrees and bookkeeping axioms which ensure that a→ be ai
b, a⊗ b e a o b, a ∧ b e a c b, and a ∨ b e a d b are all provable by C. We
inspect the following cases:
– All axioms are provable by C. First, observe that A∪B i B can equiva-
lently be written as C i B where C(p) ≥ B(p) for all p ∈ Var. Now, fix
p and let C(p) = a and B(p) = b. Using the bookkeeping axioms together
with b→ a = 1, we get
`C bi a
and as a consequence of the transitivity of implication, we get
`C (ai p) i (bi p).
Now, we may repeat the idea finitely many times for all p with C(p) > 0
and utilize
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`C (ϕ1 i ψ1) i ((ϕ2 i ψ2) i ((ϕ1 c ϕ2) i (ψ1 c ψ2)))
in order to show that C proves each axiom of our deductive system.
– In case of (Cut), observe that we have
{ϕi ψ, (ψ c χ) i ϑ} `C (ϕ c χ) i ϑ,
where ϕ,ψ, χ, ϑ are arbitrary formulas. In addition, if a formula of the
form (20) is abbreviated by B∪C i D, then it is equivalent to (ψ c χ) i
ϑ where ψ i ϑ is abbreviated by B i D and χ i ϑ is abbreviated by
C i D. Indeed, observe that (ai ϕ) c (ci ϕ) is provably equivalent to
(a d c) i ϕ, i.e., a ∨ bi ϕ by the bookkeeping axioms. As a consequence,
the derived formula (ϕ c χ) i ϑ may be abbreviated by A∪C i D
provided that ϕi ψ is abbreviated by Ai B. Altogether, the results of
(Cut) are derivable in C.
– Finally, for any ϕ, ψ, and c ∈ [0, 1]Q, we have
{ϕi ψ} `C (ci ϕ) i (ci ψ).
Furthermore, if ϕi ψ is of the form (20), then we may use
`C (ci (ϕ1 c · · · c ϕn)) e ((ci ϕ1) c · · · c (ci ϕn)).
Thus, using the bookkeeping axioms together with
`C (ϕi (ψ i χ)) e ((ϕo ψ) i χ),
we conclude that (Mul) is a derivable deduction rule in C.
(c) Note that there are several deductive systems equivalent to the system of
our axioms, (Cut), and (Mul). For instance, (Cut) and (Mul) can be reduced to
a single deduction rule [11]. Alternatively, one may introduce normalized proofs
based on the rule of accumulation analogously as in [9] (cf. also [39]). Other
deductive systems may involve the rule of simplification instead of (Cut), see [6]
(cf. also [16] and a similar deduction rule proposed by Darwen in [17]).
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Considering our deduction system, we introduce the notions of proofs and
provability degrees. A proof of A i B by Σ is any sequence of formulas
C1 i D1, . . . , Cn i Dn such that Cn = A, Dn = B, and for each i = 1, . . . , n,
we have that
(i) Ci i Di is an axiom, or
(ii) Ci i Di ∈ Σ, or
(iii) Ci i Di results from some of the formulas in {Cj i Dj ; j < i} by a
single application of the deduction rule (Cut) or (Mul).
If there is a proof of A i B by Σ, we denote the fact by Σ ` A i B and call
Ai B provable by Σ. The degree |Ai B|Σ to which Ai B is provable by Σ
is defined by
|Ai B|Σ =
∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗B}. (31)
Remark 3. The provability degrees (31) are defined in much the same way as in
RPL, i.e., via an ordinary notion of provability and without considering proofs as
sequences of weighted formulas as in the original Pavelka approach [42, 43, 44].
Indeed, in RPL [31], the degrees of provability are introduced as
|ϕ|RPLΣ =
∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ `RPL ci ϕ}. (32)
Also note that if L is  L, RPL provides a syntactic characterization of the se-
mantic entailment of the formulas considered in our logic. Indeed, for ϕ i ψ
abbreviated by Ai B, one can easily see that
||Ai B||Σ = |ϕi ψ|RPLΣ . (33)
However, RPL-based proofs of ci (ϕi ψ) by Σ may contain formulas which
are not of the form (20). In contrast, our deductive system, allows to infer
only (abbreviated representations of) formulas like (20). As a consequence,
the deduction in our system is simpler than the deduction in RPL and enables
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automated deduction as we shall see in Section 4. Analogous remarks can be
made for RΠL (but notice that RΠL has an infinitary deduction rule [21]).
The proof of the following assertion is elaborated in Section 4.
Theorem 2 (Pavelka completeness of RFAL). Let L satisfy Assumption 1 and
condition (10). Then, for any Σ and Ai B,
|Ai B|Σ = ||Ai B||Σ. (34)
In particular, (34) holds for L being  L or Π.
Using the results on RPL [32], we may get further insight into the previ-
ous completeness theorem which is based on our axiomatization. Namely, [32,
Lemma 3.3.17] gives that if Σ is finite, then each ||Ai B||Σ and thus |Ai B|Σ
is rational (for L being  L). Let us note that the proof of [32, Lemma 3.3.17] is
technically quite involved. In Section 4, we show that in case of our logic, which
considers only formulas in the special form (20), the argument is considerably
easier. The most important consequence of this property is summarized in the
following assertion which is also proved in Section 4.
Theorem 3. Let L be either of  L or Π. Then, for each finite theory Σ and
any Ai B, the degree |Ai B|Σ is rational. In addition, we have
Σ ` Ai c⊗B for c = |Ai B|Σ. (35)
Moreover, RFAL based on either of  L and Π is decidable.
In particular, for c = 1 Theorem 3 yields Σ ` Ai B iff |Ai B|Σ = 1.
4 Proofs and Notes
In this section, we give proofs of the basic assertions of RFAL presented in the
previous section. In the entire section, we assume that Assumption 1 holds and
that L satisfies (10).
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Lemma 4. For any Ai B and rational c ∈ [0, 1], we have
c→ |Ai B|Σ = |Ai c⊗B|Σ. (36)
Proof. We check both inequalities of (36).
In order to prove c → |A i B|Σ ≤ |A i c⊗B|Σ, observe that by the
definition of degrees of provability and using (10), it follows that
c→ |Ai B|Σ = c→
∨{d ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai d⊗B} (37)
=
∨{c→ d; d ∈ [0, 1]Q and Σ ` Ai d⊗B} (38)
≤ ∨{c→ d; d ∈ [0, 1]Q and Σ ` Ai (c→ d)⊗c⊗B} (39)
≤ ∨{e ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai e⊗c⊗B} (40)
because Σ ` A i d⊗B and (c → d) ⊗ c ≤ d yield Σ ` A i (c → d)⊗c⊗B by
projectivity (from Σ ` E i F∪G one may derive that Σ ` E i F , see [11,
Lemma 4.2]), i.e., Σ ` Ai e⊗c⊗B for e = c→ d. Hence,
c→ |Ai B|Σ ≤
∨{e ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai e⊗(c⊗B)} (41)
= |Ai c⊗B|Σ. (42)
Conversely, in order to prove c → |A i B|Σ ≥ |A i c⊗B|Σ, it suffices to
show c⊗ |Ai c⊗B|Σ ≤ |Ai B|Σ which is indeed the case:
c⊗ |Ai c⊗B|Σ = c⊗
∨{d ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai d⊗c⊗B} (43)
=
∨{c⊗ d; d ∈ [0, 1]Q and Σ ` Ai (c⊗d)⊗B} (44)
≤ ∨{e ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai e⊗B} (45)
= |Ai B|Σ, (46)
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 5. For any finite index set I and an I-indexed set {Bi; i ∈ I} of finite
rational L-sets in Var, we have
∧{|Ai Bi|Σ; i ∈ I} = |Ai ⋃{Bi; i ∈ I}|Σ (47)
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for any finite rational L-set A in Var.
Proof. Observe that the claim is trivial for I = ∅ because
∧ ∅ = 1 = |Ai ⊥|Σ = |Ai ⋃ ∅|Σ, (48)
where ⊥(p) = 0 for all p ∈ Var. Therefore, we may only inspect the situation
for non-empty finite I. Observe that
⋃{Bi; i ∈ I} is finite and rational, i.e.,
the formula A i
⋃{Bi; i ∈ I} which appears on the right-hand side of (47) is
well defined. We prove (47) by checking both inequalities.
By definition of provability degrees and using the complete distributivity of
the real unit interval (with its natural ordering, see [18, 46]), we have
∧{|Ai Bi|Σ; i ∈ I} = ∧{∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗Bi}; i ∈ I} (49)
=
∨{∧{f(i); i ∈ I}; f ∈ F}, (50)
where
F = ∏{{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗Bi}; i ∈ I} (51)
is the direct product of subsets {c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗Bi} of [0, 1]Q. That is,
F is the set of all maps (choice functions) of the form f : I → [0, 1]Q such that
Σ ` Ai f(i)⊗Bi (52)
for all i ∈ I. Since I is finite, (52) yields
Σ ` Ai ⋃{f(i)⊗Bi; i ∈ I} (53)
by additivity (from Σ ` E i F and Σ ` E i G it follows that Σ ` E i
F∪G, see [11, Lemma 4.2]). Furthermore, {f(i); i ∈ I} has the least element∧{f(i); i ∈ I} because L is linear and I is non-empty and finite. Therefore, by
projectivity, we get
Σ ` Ai ⋃{∧{f(i); i ∈ I}⊗Bi; i ∈ I}. (54)
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Hence, using the distributivity of ⊗ over general ⋃, it follows that
Σ ` Ai c⊗⋃{Bi; i ∈ I} (55)
for c =
∧{f(i); i ∈ I} ∈ [0, 1]Q. Therefore, (50) may be extended as∧{|Ai Bi|Σ; i ∈ I} = ∨{∧{f(i); i ∈ I}; f ∈ F} (56)
≤ ∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗⋃{Bi; i ∈ I}} (57)
= |Ai ⋃{Bi; i ∈ I}|Σ, (58)
which proves the “≤”-inequality of (47).
Conversely, using projectivity and distributivity of ⊗ over general ⋃:
|Ai ⋃{Bi; i ∈ I}|Σ = ∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗⋃{Bi; i ∈ I}} (59)
=
∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai ⋃{c⊗Bi; i ∈ I}} (60)
≤ ∨{c ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai c⊗Bi} (61)
= |Ai Bi|Σ (62)
for arbitrary i ∈ I which proves the converse inequality of (47).
Lemma 6. For any Ai B, B i C, Ai C, and Σ,
|Ai B|Σ ⊗ |B i C|Σ ≤ |Ai C|Σ. (63)
Proof. Let Σ ` A i b⊗B and Σ ` B i c⊗C for some b, c ∈ [0, 1]Q. Using
(Mul), we infer Σ ` b⊗B i b⊗c⊗C from Σ ` B i c⊗C. Therefore, using
(Cut) on Σ ` Ai b⊗B and Σ ` b⊗B i b⊗c⊗C, we get Σ ` Ai b⊗c⊗C. As
a consequence,
|Ai B|Σ ⊗ |B i C|Σ =
∨{b⊗ c; Σ ` Ai b⊗B and Σ ` B i c⊗C} (64)
≤ ∨{b⊗ c; Σ ` Ai b⊗c⊗C} (65)
=
∨{d ∈ [0, 1]Q; Σ ` Ai d⊗C} (66)
= |Ai C|Σ, (67)
which proves (63).
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Lemma 7. If Σ 0 Ai c⊗B for c ∈ [0, 1]Q, then ||Ai B||Σ ≤ c.
Proof. We assume Σ 0 Ai c⊗B and we find an evaluation e which is a model
of Σ and satisfies ||Ai B||e ≤ c. For every p ∈ Var, put
e(p) = |Ai {1/p}|Σ. (68)
Next, we prove an auxiliary claim: For each finite rational L-set C in Var, we
have S(C, e) = |Ai C|Σ where e is given by (68). Using the fact that C may be
expressed by a union of finitely many rational singletons in Var and using (36)
together with (47), it follows that
S(C, e) =
∧{C(p)→ e(p); p ∈ Var} (69)
=
∧{C(p)→ |Ai {1/p}|Σ; p ∈ Var} (70)
=
∧{|Ai C(p)⊗{1/p}|Σ; p ∈ Var} (71)
=
∧{|Ai {C(p)/p}|Σ; p ∈ Var} (72)
=
∧{|Ai {C(p)/p}|Σ; p ∈ Var and C(p) > 0} (73)
= |Ai ⋃{{C(p)/p}; p ∈ Var and C(p) > 0}|Σ (74)
= |Ai C|Σ. (75)
Using the claim, we prove that e is a model of Σ. Indeed, take any E i F ∈ Σ
and observe that (63) yields
S(E, e) = |Ai E|Σ (76)
= |Ai E|Σ ⊗ 1 (77)
= |Ai E|Σ ⊗ |E i F |Σ (78)
≤ |Ai F |Σ (79)
= S(F, e), (80)
showing ||E i F ||e = 1 owing to (29). Furthermore, we have
S(A, e) = |Ai A|Σ = 1, (81)
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because A i A is an axiom. Furthermore, if d > c for d ∈ [0, 1]Q, then our
assumption Σ 0 Ai c⊗B yields Σ 0 Ai d⊗B because otherwise the assump-
tion Σ 0 Ai c⊗B would be violated on account of projectivity. Therefore,
S(B, e) = |Ai B|Σ ≤ c (82)
As a consequence of (81) and (82), we get
||Ai B||Σ ≤ ||Ai B||e (83)
= S(A, e)→ S(B, e) (84)
≤ 1→ c (85)
= c, (86)
which is the desired inequality.
Theorem 2 can be now proved as follows:
Proof of Theorem 2. The inequality |Ai B|Σ ≤ ||Ai B||Σ, i.e., Pavelka-style
soundness, follows by standard arguments. In order to prove the completeness
in Pavelka style, we prove that for each c ∈ [0, 1]Q such that c < ||A i B||Σ,
we have Σ ` Ai c⊗B which immediately gives ||Ai B||Σ ≤ |Ai B|Σ. But
this is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.
Since the degrees of semantic entailment of formulas of the form (20) in
RPL and RΠL are defined as in our logic, we immediately get the following
consequence on the relationship of to these two Pavelka-style complete logics:
Corollary 8. The following are consequences of Theorem 2:
• If L is  L, then RFAL is a fragment of RPL.
• If L is Π, then RFAL is a fragment of RΠL.
Remark 4. (a) Recall that RΠL utilizes an infinitary deduction rule [21] to
ensure completeness in Pavelka style. In contrast, our logic for L being Π, has
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the usual finitary notion of a proof. In other words, we have shown that RΠL
restricted just to formulas of the form (20) can be axiomatized without infinitary
deduction rules.
(b) RFAL is not Pavelka-style complete with L being the standard Go¨del
algebra (i.e., L defined on the real unit interval with ⊗ = ∧). Observe that for
Σ =
{{0/p}i {a/p}; a ∈ [0, 0.5)Q} ∪ {{0.5/p}i {1/q}}, (87)
we obviously have ||{0/p}i {1/q}||Σ = 1 for L being the standard Go¨del algebra
because for each model e of Σ, we have e(p) ≥ 0.5 and thus e(q) = 1. On the
other hand, we have |{0/p}i {1/q}|Σ < 1. Indeed, each finite Σ′ ⊆ Σ admits a
rational model e such that e(p) = a < 0.5 and e(q) = a. Owing to soundness, we
get |{0/p}i {1/q}|Σ′ ≤ a < 0.5 and thus |{0/p}i {1/q}|Σ ≤ 0.5 < 1. Therefore,
in order to ensure completeness in Pavelka style for L being the standard Go¨del
algebra, one has to resort to infinitary deduction rules as in [8, 37].
(c) Note for readers familiar with Pavelka’s abstract logic as it is presented
in [32, Section 9.2]: Our approach uses the traditional understanding of theories
as sets of formulas. Following Pavelka’s ideas, one may extend it to use theories
considered as L-sets of formulas. This approach is, however, reducible to the
traditional one: For Σ considered as an L-set which for any Ai B prescribes a
general degree Σ(Ai B) ∈ [0, 1] (including irrational degrees), we may consider
Σ∗ = {Ai c⊗B; c ∈ [0, 1]Q and c < Σ(Ai B)}
which does the same job, see [32, Section 9.2] for further details on semantic
and syntactic entailment from “fuzzy theories.”
We now turn our attention to the proof of Theorem 3. We utilize a character-
ization of degrees of provability based on constructing least models containing
given evaluations. For each evaluation e and a theory Σ, we consider evaluations
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enΣ (n is a finite ordinal) and e
ω
Σ (ω denotes the least infinite ordinal) as follows:
e0Σ = e, (88)
en+1Σ = e
n
Σ ∪
⋃{S(A, enΣ)⊗B; Ai B ∈ Σ}, (89)
eωΣ =
⋃{enΣ; n < ω}, (90)
for all n < ω. Observe that if Σ is finite and the evaluation e is finite and
rational (recall that e is in fact an L-set), then enΣ is finite and rational for each
n < ω provided that L satisfies Assumption 1. The following assertions show
properties of eωΣ given by (90).
Lemma 9. Let L satisfy (10), Σ be a theory and e be an evaluation. Then, eωΣ
given by (90) is the least model of Σ which contains e.
Proof. We first show that eωΣ is a model of Σ. Directly by (89), for each formula
Ai B ∈ Σ and each n < ω, we have
S(A, enΣ)⊗B ⊆ en+1Σ . (91)
Therefore,
⋃{S(A, enΣ)⊗B; n < ω} ⊆ ⋃{en+1Σ ; n < ω} = eωΣ. (92)
In addition, using (16), (90), and (10), it follows that
S(A, eωΣ)⊗B =
∧{A(p)→ eωΣ(p); p ∈ Var} ⊗B (93)
=
∧{A(p)→ ∨{enΣ(p); n < ω}; p ∈ Var} ⊗B (94)
=
∧{∨{A(p)→ enΣ(p); n < ω}; p ∈ Var} ⊗B. (95)
Let F denote the set of all maps of the form f : Var → {n; n < ω}. Using
complete distributivity, the previous equality can be extended as
S(A, eωΣ)⊗B =
∨{∧{A(p)→ ef(p)Σ (p); p ∈ Var}; f ∈ F} ⊗B. (96)
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In addition, A is a finite L-set. Therefore, there are only finitely many p ∈ Var
such that A(p)→ ef(p)Σ (p) < 1. As a consequence, for any f ∈ F , there is n < ω
such that
∧{A(p)→ ef(p)Σ (p); p ∈ Var} ≤ ∧{A(p)→ enΣ(p); p ∈ Var}. (97)
Hence, (96) is equivalent to
S(A, eωΣ)⊗B =
∨{∧{A(p)→ enΣ(p); p ∈ Var}; n < ω} ⊗B (98)
=
∨{S(A, enΣ); n < ω} ⊗B (99)
=
⋃{S(A, enΣ)⊗B; n < ω} (100)
⊆ eωΣ (101)
using (92). Hence, we have shown S(A, eωΣ)⊗B ⊆ eωΣ for any Ai B ∈ Σ, i.e.,
S(A, eωΣ) ≤ S(B, eωΣ) (102)
for any Ai B ∈ Σ and so eωΣ is a model of Σ.
Now, consider a model e′ of Σ such that e ⊆ e′, i.e., e(p) ≤ e′(p) for all
p ∈ Var. Then, by induction, enΣ ⊆ e′ gives
S(A, enΣ)⊗B ⊆ S(A, e′)⊗B ⊆ e′ (103)
for all A i B ∈ Σ, i.e., (89) immediately yields en+1Σ ⊆ e′. As a consequence,
eωΣ ⊆ e′, showing that eωΣ is indeed the least model of Σ containing e.
A description of provability degrees based on least models is now established.
Indeed, using the existing result described in [11, Theorem 3.11], it follows that
||Ai B||Σ = S(B, e) for e being the least model of Σ containing A. Applying
Theorem 2 and Lemma 9, we get the following characterization.
Corollary 10. Let L satisfy Assumption 1 and condition (10). Then, for any
Σ and Ai B,
|Ai B|Σ = S(B,AωΣ). (104)
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Proof. Consequence of Theorem 2, Lemma 9, and [11, Theorem 3.11].
In case of  L and Π, the observation in Lemma 9 and its consequence in
Corollary 10 may further be improved provided that Σ is finite in which case
one may always take some enΣ instead of e
ω
Σ:
Lemma 11. Let L be either of  L or Π. Then, for any finite theory Σ and a
rational evaluation e there is n such that eωΣ = e
n
Σ.
Proof. We inspect the situation for  L and Π separately. In the proof, we denote
by O the set of all propositional variables which appear in formulas in Σ. That
is, p ∈ O whenever there is A i B ∈ Σ such that A(p) > 0 or B(p) >
0. Analogously, by K we denote the set of non-zero degrees (represented by
constants) which appear in formulas in Σ. That is, c ∈ K whenever there is
Ai B ∈ Σ such that A(p) = c > 0 or B(p) = c > 0 for some p ∈ Var.
Note that since Σ is finite, then O is finite as well. As a consequence, there
are at most finitely many p ∈ Var such that eωΣ(p) > e(p). Namely, eωΣ(p) > e(p)
implies that p ∈ O which follows directly by (89). Therefore, in the proof, we
tacitly assume that e(p) = 0 whenever p 6∈ O.
Let L be  L and observe that since K is finite and all degrees in K are
rational, then one may consider a finite equidistant  Lukasiewicz subchain of  L
consisting of rational truth degrees which contains all the degrees from K and
{e(p); p ∈ Var}. Denote the subchain by L′ and its support set by L′. Then,
inspecting (88) and (89), it follows that each enΣ is rational and
{enΣ(p); p ∈ Var} ⊆ L′ (105)
because each enΣ(p) may be expressed by finitely many applications of operations
in L′. As a consequence, eωΣ = e
n
Σ for some n < ω because only finitely may
propositional variables (those in O) are assigned finitely many different degrees
(those in L′), i.e., the chain e0Σ ⊆ e1Σ ⊆ e2Σ ⊆ · · · consists of only finitely many
proper inclusions.
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For L being Π, we proceed by contradiction: We assume there are p ∈ Var
such that enΣ(p) < e
ω
Σ(p) for all n < ω. Since Σ and O are finite, there are
pairwise distinct p0, . . . , pm−1 ∈ Var and formulas A0 i B0, . . . , Am−1 i Bm−1
in Σ such that for pm = p0 and for infinitely many n < ω, we have
en+1Σ (p1) = (A0(p0)→ enΣ(p0))⊗B0(p1), (106)
en+2Σ (p2) = (A1(p1)→ en+1Σ (p1))⊗B1(p2), (107)
...
...
en+mΣ (pm) = (Am−1(pm−1)→ en+m−1Σ (pm−1))⊗Bm−1(pm), (108)
and the following conditions are satisfied:
– en+iΣ (pi) > e
n+i−1
Σ (pi) for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and
– Ai(pi) > e
n+i
Σ (pi) for all i = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
As a consequence, en+mΣ (p0) = e
n+m
Σ (pm) > e
n
Σ(p0). Furthermore, directly by
the definition of → in Π, we get that
en+iΣ (pi) =
en+i−1Σ (pi−1) ·Bi−1(pi)
Ai−1(pi−1)
(109)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Therefore, en+mΣ (p0) may be expressed as
en+mΣ (p0) = e
n+m
Σ (pm) =
enΣ(p0) ·B0(p1) ·B1(p2) · · ·Bm−1(pm)
A0(p0) ·A1(p1) · · ·Am−1(pm−1) . (110)
That is, we have en+mΣ (p0) = e
n
Σ(p0) · c for c > 1. Since we have assumed that
(106)–(108) hold for infinitely many n, then there are n1, n2, . . . such that
e
ni+1
Σ (p0) ≥ eni+mΣ (p0) = eniΣ (p0) · c (111)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . and thus
eniΣ (p0) ≥ en1Σ (p0) · ci−1 (112)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . which means that
lim
i→∞
eniΣ (p0) ≥ limi→∞ e
n1
Σ (p0) · ci−1 = en1Σ (p0) limi→∞ c
i−1 =∞, (113)
which contradicts the fact that enΣ(p0) < e
ω
Σ(p0) for all n < ω.
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Lemma 12. Let Σ be finite. Then, Σ ` Ai AnΣ for all n < ω.
Proof. The proof goes by induction. Notice that since Σ is finite, then AnΣ is
rational and finite for any n < ω, i.e., Ai AnΣ is well defined formula. Suppose
that Σ ` A i AnΣ and take E i F ∈ Σ. Then, using (Mul) for c = S(E,AnΣ),
we have Σ ` S(E,AnΣ)⊗E i S(E,AnΣ)⊗F . Then, using S(E,AnΣ)⊗E ⊆ AnΣ and
(Cut), we get Σ ` Ai S(E,AnΣ)⊗F . Inspecting (89), we prove Σ ` Ai An+1Σ
by finitely many applications of additivity (from Σ ` E i F and Σ ` E i G
we derive Σ ` E i F∪G, see [11, Lemma 4.2]) because Σ is finite.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let L be either of  L or Π and let Σ be finite. Taking into
account Corollary 10 and Lemma 11, we get
|Ai B|Σ = S(B,AωΣ) = S(B,AnΣ) (114)
for some n < ω. Since both B and AnΣ are finite and rational, S(B,A
n
Σ) is a
rational degree which proves that |Ai B|Σ is rational. In addition, Lemma 12
yields that Σ ` A i AnΣ. Hence, using the fact that S(B,AnΣ)⊗B ⊆ AnΣ, the
projectivity gives Σ ` Ai c⊗B for c = S(B,AnΣ) = |Ai B|Σ.
In addition, it is decidable whether |A i B|Σ = c: In finitely many steps,
one computes AnΣ such that A
n
Σ = A
n+1
Σ (which exists owing to Lemma 11) and
checks whether c = S(B,AnΣ). In particular, for c = 1, it means B ⊆ AnΣ iff
|A i B|Σ = 1 iff Σ ` A i 1⊗B iff Σ ` A i B, i.e., it is decidable whether
Ai B is provable by Σ.
5 Rational L-closure Operators
In this section, we present observations on closure structures associated to mod-
els of theories consisting of formulas of the form (20). We are motivated by the
fact that for any Σ, we may introduce an operator which maps each evaluation
e to eωΣ defined by (90). Under the assumption of (10), we show that such
operators are in fact finitary L-closure operators on propositional variables.
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Recall from preliminaries the general notion of an L-closure operator, see
Section 2. We call an L-closure operator c : LU → LU finitary whenever
c(A) =
⋃{c(B); B ⊆ A and B is finite} (115)
for all A ∈ LU . For A,B ∈ LU , we put
B v A (116)
whenever B is rational, finite, and B ⊆ A. Using this notation, we call an
L-closure operator c : LU → LU rational whenever
c(A) =
⋃{c(B); B v A} (117)
for all A ∈ LU . By definition, a rational L-closure operator is finitary. The
following assertions show that under the condition (10), finitary L-closure op-
erators are always rational.
Lemma 13. Let A be a finite L-set in U and let B be a directed system of
L-sets in U . If L defined on the real unit interval satisfies (10), then
S(A,
⋃B) = ∨{S(A,B); B ∈ B}. (118)
Proof. Note that since B is directed, it is also non-empty. Let F denote the set
of all functions from Var to B. Under this notation, using (10) and the complete
distributivity, we get
S(A,
⋃B) = ∧{A(p)→ (⋃B)(p); p ∈ Var} (119)
=
∧{A(p)→ ∨{B(p); B ∈ B}; p ∈ Var} (120)
=
∧{∨{A(p)→ B(p); B ∈ B}; p ∈ Var} (121)
=
∨{∧{A(p)→ (f(p))(p); p ∈ Var}; f ∈ F}. (122)
Now, since A is finite and B is directed, for each f ∈ F there is B ∈ B such that
f(p) ⊆ B for all p ∈ Var satisfying A(p) > 0 and thus (f(p))(p) ≤ B(p) for all
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p ∈ Var satisfying A(p) > 0. Therefore, we have
S(A,
⋃B) = ∨{∧{A(p)→ (f(p))(p); p ∈ Var}; f ∈ F} (123)
=
∨{∧{A(p)→ B(p); p ∈ Var}; B ∈ B} (124)
=
∨{S(A,B); B ∈ B}, (125)
which establishes (118).
Lemma 14. Let A be a finite L-set in U . If L defined on the real unit interval
satisfies (10), then for any ε < 1 there is Bε v A such that S(A,Bε) > ε.
Proof. Consider L-sets Bn (n < ω) with Bn ⊆ Bn+1 and Bn v A for all n < ω
such that and
⋃{Bn; n < ω} = A. Since {Bn; n < ω} is obviously directed,
Lemma 13 yields
1 = S(A,
⋃{Bn; n < ω}) = ∨{S(A,Bn); n < ω}. (126)
Hence, for every ε < 1 there is Bε v A such that S(A,Bε) > ε otherwise our
observation 1 =
∨{S(A,Bn); n < ω} would be violated.
Lemma 15. Let L satisfy (10). Then, every finitary L-closure operator is
rational.
Proof. Let c : LU → LU be an L-closure operator which is finitary. It suffices
to show that for any finite L-set A in U , we have c(A) =
⋃{c(B); B v A}.
Based on the observation in Lemma 14, for each n < ω we let Bn ∈ LU such
that Bn v A and S(A,Bn) > 1− 1n . Applying the monotony (18) of c, for any
n < ω, we have S(A,Bn)⊗ c(A) ⊆ c(Bn), i.e.,
c(A) = 1⊗ c(A) = ∨{S(A,Bn); n < ω} ⊗ c(A) (127)
=
⋃{S(A,Bn)⊗ c(A); n < ω} (128)
⊆ ⋃{c(Bn); n < ω}. (129)
The converse inclusion holds trivially. As a consequence, c is rational.
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Remark 5. Let us note that the assumption of L satisfying (10) in Lemma 15 is
essential. Indeed, in general there are finitary L-closure operators which are not
rational. For instance, let L be the standard Go¨del algebra, consider U = {u},
and let c be an irrational number in [0, 1]. Put
c({a/u})(u) =

a, for a < c,
1, otherwise.
(130)
Obviously, c satisfies (17) and (19). In order to see that c satisfies (18), ob-
serve that in the non-trivial case for {a/u} and {b/u} with a > b, we have
S({a/u}, {b/u}) = b. Now, if a ≥ c and b < c, we get
S(c({a/u}), c({b/u})) = 1→ b = b = S({a/u}, {b/u}) (131)
If both a ≥ c and b ≥ c, the condition is trivial; the same applies if a < c and
b < c. Altogether, c is an L-closure operator. Furthermore,
∨{c({a/u})(u); a ∈ [0, 1]Q and a ≤ c} = c < 1 = c({c/u})(u), (132)
i.e., c is finitary but it is not rational.
Now, for any Σ and evaluation e, we put
cΣ(e) = e
ω
Σ. (133)
The following assertions characterize operators defined as in (133) for all possible
choices of Σ.
Theorem 16. Let L satisfy (10). Then, for each Σ, cΣ : L
Var → LVar defined
by (133) is a rational L-closure operator.
Proof. The fact that cΣ is an L-closure operator follows by the general result
in [11, Theorem 3.9] which holds for any complete residuated lattice L taken as
the structure of degrees. Also, the “⊇”-part of (117) is trivial. Thus, it suffices
to check the “⊆”-part of (117). Let G = {g ∈ LVar; g v e}. We proceed by
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checking that
⋃{cΣ(g); g ∈ G} is a model of Σ containing e. Observe that G is
directed and so is {cΣ(g); g ∈ G} owing to the monotony (18) of c. Take any
A i B ∈ Σ. Applying Lemma 13 and the fact that for each g ∈ G, cΣ(g) is a
model of Σ and so S(A, cΣ(g))⊗B ⊆ cΣ(g), it follows that
S(A,
⋃{cΣ(g); g ∈ G})⊗B = ∨{S(A, cΣ(g)); g ∈ G} ⊗B (134)
=
⋃{S(A, cΣ(g))⊗B; g ∈ G} (135)
⊆ ⋃{cΣ(g); g ∈ G}, (136)
i.e.,
⋃{cΣ(g); g ∈ G} is indeed a model of Σ which obviously contains e.
Theorem 17. Let L satisfy (10) and let c : LVar → LVar be a finitary L-closure
operator. Then, there is Σ such that c = cΣ.
Proof. Let > ∈ LVar such that >(p) = 1 for all p ∈ Var. We put
Σ = {Ai B; A v > and B v c(A)} (137)
and prove the claim holds for Σ.
First, we show that for any evaluation e, c(e) is a model of Σ, i.e., c(e) is
closed under cΣ. Let Ai B ∈ Σ. Since B ⊆ c(A), (18) and (19) yield
S(A, c(e)) ≤ S(c(A), c(c(e))) (138)
= S(c(A), c(e)) (139)
≤ S(B, c(e)), (140)
showing that c(e) is a model of Σ.
Conversely, we show that cΣ(e) is a fixed point of c. Take any A v cΣ(e).
Trivially, S(A, cΣ(e)) = 1 and thus for any B v c(A), we have S(B, cΣ(e)) = 1,
i.e., B ⊆ cΣ(e) because A i B ∈ Σ and cΣ(e) is a model of Σ. Now, the fact
that B ⊆ cΣ(e) holds for all B v c(A) yields that
c(A) =
⋃{B; B v c(A)} ⊆ cΣ(e). (141)
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Furthermore, the previous inclusion holds for any A v cΣ(e), i.e., utilizing the
fact that c is rational which follows by Lemma 15, we have
c(cΣ(e)) =
⋃{c(A); A v cΣ(e)} ⊆ cΣ(e), (142)
proving that cΣ(e) is a fixed point of c.
Theorem 16 and Theorem 17 showed that under the assumption (10), the
operators on L-sets of propositional variables defined by (133) are exactly all
rational L-closure operators on propositional variables. In other words, the
systems of fixed points of rational L-closure operators on propositional variables
are the systems of models of sets of rational fuzzy attribute implications, cf.
[50] for a study of the expressive power of general fuzzy attribute implications
parameterized by hedges.
Conclusion
Logic for reasoning with graded if-then rules is proposed. The rules can be seen
as formulas of the form of implications which contain constants for rational truth
degrees. The interpretation of formulas is given by complete residuated lattices
defined on the real unit interval. Degrees of semantic entailment and degrees of
provability are defined. For complete residuated lattices with residuum which
is continuous in the second argument, the logic is Pavelka-style complete which
means that degrees of semantic entailment agree with degrees of provability.
Characterization of the degrees of provability based on computing least models
is established. In case of finite theories and the standard  Lukasiewicz or Goguen
(product) algebras, the least models may be determined in finitely many steps
which shows that the logic based on these structures of degrees is decidable.
Structures of models are identified with fixed points of rational L-closure oper-
ators. It is shown that the property of being rational is a consequence of the
property of being finitary in case of structures of truth degrees with residua
continuous in the second argument.
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